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Abstract; Public policy toward mergers and joint ventures is 
increasingly based on the belief that the consequences of such 
activities for market performance are iargely positive. A review of 
the theoretical and empirical literature on mergers shows that there 






















































































































































































Public policy in most developed economies maintains the position 
that market structure matters for market performance arid that it is in 
the public interest to prevent mergers that worsen market performance. 
This is true of the United States, which has the world's most active 
antitrust tradition.’ It is true of Japan, which inherited an 
antimonopoly law as part of the legacy of post-World War II 
occupation. It is true of the European Community, which has recently 
enhanced the merger control powers of the European Commission.
But enforcement of these policies falls short of the underlying 
principles. This has always been the case for Japan, where the 
importance of consensus and coordinated development of market 
structure have been honoured much more than the desirability of 
maintaining competitive market structure, It is true of the United 
States, where the Reagan Administration essentially withdrew the 
Government from the business of enforcing merger control legislation.
And the thresholds for application of the new EC merger law are set at 
a comfortably high level.1 2
Increasingly, the enforcement of public policy toward mergers is 
guided by a belief in the importance of economies of large scale, 
which can be realized through mergers, and in the desirability of 
creating or reinforcing national champions to maintain a presence in 
an imperfectly competitive world markets. Despite the formal 
framework of competition policy, policymakers in practice seem to 
distrust the market as a resource allocation mechanism.
1. Although not the oldest; that distinction belongs to Canada.



























































































Policymakers' beliefs iri the favourable effects of mergers on 
market performance are unsupported by economic theory, which suggests 
that endogenous mergers are likeiy to increase market power and leave 
consumers worse off. They are unsupported by empirical studies, which 
do not suggest the existence of widespread economies of scale or of 
efficiencies flowing from mergers. They have the logical implication 
that if merger policy is to be permissive, home markets should be open 
to foreign competition, to ensure that benefits flowing from p ost- 
merger efficiencies are, as much as possible, passed on to consumers.
II. Public Policy Toward Mergers
A. United States
Under U.S. antitrust law, mergers by dominant firms are subject 
to the Sherman Act Section 2 prohibition of monopolization.3 4 But the 
encompassing statement of U.S. policy toward mergers is Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act, as amended by the Ceiler-Kefauver Act of 1950. This 
legislation lays down a severe policy toward horizontal, vertical, and 
conglomerate mergers. It prohibits mergers which will probably lessen 
competition: no actual or certain lessening of competition is 
necessary to  run afoul of the law's prohibitions.-1
The U.S. Department of Justice periodically issues Merger 
Guidelines to inform the business community. The most recent such 
guidelines were issued in 1984, and contain statements of federal
3. See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey et al. v. U.S. 221 U.S. 1 
(1911), U.S. v. American Tobacco Co. 221 U.S. 106 (1911), U.S. v. 
United States Steel Corp. et al. 251 U.S. 417 (1920), and U.S. v. 
Aluminum Company of America 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
4. Leading interpretations are Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 




























































































authorities' policy toward horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate 
mergers.5
Horizontal Mergers
The 1984 Guidelines emphasize the efficiencies that are alleged 
to flow from mergers;6
The primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their 
efficiency-enhancing potential, which can increase the 
competitiveness of firms and result in lower prices to 
consumers. Because the antitrust laws, and thus the 
Guidelines, are designed to proscribe only mergers that 
present a significant danger to competition, they do not 
present an obstacle to most mergers. As a consequence, in 
the majority of cases, the Guidelines will allow firms to 
achieve available efficiencies through mergers without 
interference from the Department.
Some mergers that the Department might otherwise 
challenge may be reasonably necessary to achieve significant 
net efficiencies. If the parties to the merger establish by 
clear and' convincing evidence that a merger will achieve 
such efficiencies, the Department will consider those 
efficiencies in deciding whether to challenge the merger.
Cognizable efficiencies include, but are not limited 
to, achieving economies of scale, better integration of 
production facilities, plant specialization, lower 
transportation costs, and similar efficiencies relating to 
specific manufacturing, servicing, or distribution 
operations of the merging firms....the Department will 
reject claims of efficiencies if equivalent or comparable 
savings can reasonably be achieved by the parties through 
other means.
Under these guidelines, the Justice Department will challenge 
only mergers that represent a "significant" danger to competition. It 
is difficult to reconcile this with the Supreme Court's statement that
5. For a comparison with the 1968 and 1982 Guidelines, see Martin 
[1988],
6. Department of Justice, 1984 Guidelines, pp. 35-36 . A quite 
different policy position is presented in the 1987 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys General. National 
Association of Attorneys General, Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the 





























































































Congress intended the Clayton Act to be applied to probable incipient 
lessenings of competition.'
In numerous decisions, the Supreme Court has indicated that 
efficiencies will not save an otherwise illegal merger. The 1984 
Guidelines indicate that the Justice Department will consider;, 
efficiencies when it decides whether or not to challenge a merger.
Once again, it is difficult to reconcile the Guidelines with 
interpretations of the law that have never been overruled.
Nonhorizontai Mergers
The 1982 and 1984 Guidelines combine vertical and conglomerate
mergers under the general heading of "nonhorizontai" mergers:3
By definition, non-horizontal mergers involve firms that do not 
operate in the same market. It necessarily follows that such 
mergers produce no immediate change in the level of concentration 
in any relevant market.... Although non-horizontal mergers are 
less likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive 
problems, they are not invariably innocuous.
The Guidelines indicate a willingness to challenge non-horizontal 
mergers that eliminate potential competitors, vertical mergers that 
create barrier^ to entry (if one of the markets is highly 
concentrated!, and vertical mergers that aid collusion. 78
7. Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)





























































































An economist could hardly wish for a more articulate statement of
the merits of competition and the need for competition policy than
that contained in the European Commission's First Report on
Competition Policy [1972, p. l l ] : s
Competition is the best stimulant of economic activity since 
it guarantees the widest possible freedom of action to all.
An active competition policy ... makes it easier for the supply 
and demand structures continually to adjust to technological 
development. ...Through the interplay of decentralized decision­
making machinery, competition enables enterprises continuously 
to improve their efficiency... competition policy is an 
essential means for satisfying ...the individual and collective 
needs of our society.
The explicit reference to decentralized decision making implies a 
certain public interest in the nature of market concentration. But 
the cornerstones of Community competition policy. Articles 85 and 86 
of the EC Treaty, are at best imperfect tools for merger control.9 10 
These provisions, which prohibit restrictive agreements and concerted 
practices (Article 85) and abuse of a dominant position (Article 86) 
are designed to regulate conduct rather than structure. This has not 
prevented applications to merger,11 but from the point of view of 
competition policy the results were far from first-best.
9. See also the Fourteenth Report on Competition Policy, p. 11 and 
the Fifteenth Report on Competition Policy, p. 15.
10. This contrasts with Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty.
11. The leading application of Article 86 to mergers is the 
Continental Can case (Commission Decision 7 2 /2 1 /EEC of 9 December 1971 
Re Continental Can Company Incorporated JO L L7/25 8 January 1972 
[1972] CMLR D ll; Europemballage & Continental Can Co v. EC Commission, 
Case 6 /72, Judgment of 21 February 1973; (1973) ECR 215; (1973) CMLR 
219. As regards Article 85, see Philip Morris (British American 
Tobacco Company Limited and R.J. Reynolds Industries Inc. v. E.C. 
Commission (Philip Morris Inc. and Rembrandt Group Limited 



























































































The failure to include a specific merger control measure in tjie
E.C. Treaty was deliberate (Banks [1988, p. 375]):
...omission of a merger control provision from the Treaty is not 
surprising, given European economic thinking at that time. One 
of the main objectives of the EEC was to bring about the 
economies of scale made possible by an enlarged European market. 
Mergers— and especially mergers across national boundaries--were 
seen as part of the process of European integration and as 
necessary in order to enable European industry to adapt to the 
new dimensions of the Common Market and to compete effectively 
against large foreign (notably American! enterprises. ...the 
Member States clearly did not wish to include in the Treaty , any 
provision which might inhibit such developments.
Nonetheless, remarks on the desirability of "more systematic
supervision arrangements for mergers reaching a certain scale" appear
in the Second Report on Competition Policy (E.C. Commission [1973, pp.
27-28]!, and regularly thereafter. It was not until 17 years later,
in the Nineteenth Report on Competition Policy, that the Commission
was able to describe the provisions of a Council Regulation for the
control of mergers 12 The regulation makes a distinction between
strictly national mergers and mergers that affect market structure at
the Community level (E.C. Commission [1990b, pp. 11-12]):
The basic concept underlying the Regulation is to establish a 
clear distinction between mergers having a Community dimension, 
for which the Commission will be responsible and those whose 
main impact is at national level, which will come under the 
responsibility of the national authorities.
Its field of application is defined on the basis of quantitative 
criteria reflecting the overall economic and financial power of 
the undertakings concerned, their level of activity within the 
Community and the transnational nature of the operation. The 
current thresholds for intervention by the Commission have been 
set at a fairly high level...The Commission intends to propose 
that the thresholds be revised downwards.
12. Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064 /89  0J L 395/1 30.12.89; for a 




























































































For mergers that are subject to Community control, the critical
issue is the impact of the merger on effective competition [E.C. 
Commission [1990b, p. 35]):13
All mergers falling within the scope of the Regulation will be 
assessed on the basis of clearly defined criteria. The basic 
concept is that of 'dominant position'. The creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position will be declared 
incompatible with the common market if effective competition is 
impeded to a significant extent, whether within the common market 
as a whole, or in a substantial part thereof; conversely, a 
merger which does not impede effective competition will be 
declared compatible with the common market. The assessment 
process will take various aspects of competition into account.
These will include the structure of markets concerned, actual and 
potential competition (from inside and outside the Community), 
the market position of the undertakings concerned, the scope for 
choice on the part of third parties, barriers to entry, the 
interests of consumers, and technical and economic progress.
The ambivalent attitude toward control of market structures
remains, however. One the one hand, the Commission asserts the need
for such measures (E.C. Commission [1990b, pp. 33-34]):
Merger control is necessary for both economic and political 
reasons. The process of restructuring European industry has 
given rise and will continue to give rise to a wave of mergers. 
Although many such mergers have not posed any problems from the 
competition point of view, it must be ensured that they do not 
in the long run jeopardize the competition process, which lies 
at the heart of the common market and is essential in securing 
all the benefits linked with the single market. In addition, 
it has become ever more clearly apparent that national rules 
are inadequate as a means of controlling Community-scale 
mergers, mainly because such rules are restricted to  the 
respective territories of the Member States concerned.
But in other places, the Commission highlights the same perceived
need to challenge extra-Community firms that affected the terms of the
Treaty of Rome (E.C. Commission [1988, p. }:
13. Commission Decision 9 1 /6 1 9/EEC of 2 October 1991 in Case No 
IV/M.053 -  Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland O.J L 33 4 /42  5.12.91 found 
a concentration incompatible with the common market based on the high 
market shares, the elimination of an actual competitor, the increase 
in the product range, and on the broadening of the customer base that 



























































































The creation of an European industrial base means making
available to industrial groups a type of transnational company, 
independent of national laws, which makes it possible to 
concentrate substantial assets and compete with American and 
Japanese business....
In addition, the Commission continues to emphasize the beneficial
impact of mergers on the completion of the internal market (E. C.
Commission [1991, pp. 14-15]);
...the Regulation is essential to prevent the strengthening or 
emergence of dominant positions as a defensive and negative 
reaction by companies to the opening up of the internal market. 
This may be particularly so where an already tight oligopoly is 
further narrowed by mergers between companies in the same 
geographic markets. Qn the other hand mergers can-be an 
important way in which companies react positively to the internal 
market process. As long as dominant positions are not created or 
reinforced, mergers may serve to facilitate greater 
interpenetration of geographic markets that may not have 
previously been subject to the full effect of the competition 
from other Member States.
C. Japan
Japan's antimonopoly law provides, among other things, that 
(Iyori and Uesugi [1983, p. 85])
(1) mergers must be notified to the Fair Trade Commission 30
days in advance; and
(2) mergers are prohibited if "the effect of a merger may be to
substantially restrain competition in any particular field 
of trade" or if "unfair business practices have been 
employed in the course of the merger"
The Fair Trade Commission’s merger guidelines [1980] indicate the
factors it will consider in evaluating mergers.14 As regards horizontal
mergers, it is indexes of market power that are emphasized:
(1) postmerger market share, postmerger rank in the industry; the 
difference between post-merger market share and the market 
shares of competitors;
14. The description which follows is based on the English translation 




























































































(2) the state of competition in affected markets:
(a) number of competitors, height of entry barriers;
(b) existence of substitute goods and state of competition
in the markets for such goods;
£c) the overall business capability of the company after 
the merger;
(d) prospects for market growth, current domestic business 
conditions and current business conditions in related 
overseas markets.
For vertical mergers, the guidelines indicate FTC concern with
(1) the extent to which the merger results in foreclosure at
either vertical level;
(2) the effect of the merger on entry conditions, in particular
on the amount of capital that must be invested to enter the 
industry.
For conglomerate mergers, the FTC looks at
£1] potential competition between parties to the merger;
(a) for product extension mergers, substitutability between
the products involved;
for geographic extension mergers,
(b) market positions of the firms involved;
(c) influence of each firm on the other;
(d) potential for either firm to enter markets supplied by
the other;
(2) the competitive advantage of the firm after the merger;
(3) the effect of the merger on entry conditions, in particular
on the amount of capital that must be invested to enter the 
industry.
One may argue that Japan's merger guidelines, at least as regards 
vertical and conglomerate mergers, more closely reflect economic 
theory than the U. S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines.
Neither set of guidelines indicates concern with multimarket contact.15
In its implementation. Japanese competition policy is much less 
similar to that of the United States or the European Community than
15. This omission may be particularly important for Japan, given the 





























































































this description of its formal structure would imply. Modem Japanese
business policy is the outcome of a complex interaction between the
Fair Trade Commission, endowed with responsibility for enforcing
antimonopoly legislation, and government ministries with
responsibility for specific industries. Best known of these outside
Japan is MITI, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. As
noted by Caves and Uekusa [1976, p. 149]:1S
The goals of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
have varied over time in weight and composition, but some have 
recurred regularly since the ministry's founding in 1949. One 
has been to promote the movement of resources to certain favoured 
industries.... Another goal has been to promote larger operations 
in certain lndustries--larger plants because of an abiding faith 
in economies of scale, and larger firms in the belief that 
...Japanese firms should be as large as their American 
competitors in order to compete with them effectively. This goal 
has led at times to a considerable enthusiasm for mergers and the 
restriction of new entry into industries of interest to MITI. ...
MITI has often failed to achieve its goals. The 1961 plan to
consolidate the Japanese automobile industry around three firms, each
specialized in a different segment of the market, is a notable example
(Magaziner and Hout [1980, p. 63]; Iwasaki [1988, p. 504]). But it
seems clear that the persuasive and consensus-building approach of
government agencies is more characteristic of Japanese policy toward
business than the regulatory and confrontational approach of U.S. 16
16. Regarding Japanese belief in economies of scale, see Hadley 
[1970, p. 109], Tsuruta [1988, p. 67, pp. 81-82], Yamawaki [1988, p. 




























































































antitrust.17 In any event, the merger-control provisions of the 
Japanese antimonopoly law have been little applied (lyori and Uesugl 
[1983, pp 25-26].
In the spring of 1968, the three largest paper manufacturing 
companies in Japan..., which together held 60Z of the market in 
newsprint, made public their merger plan. Soon thereafter, the 
two largest Japanese steel makers..., which together held 35.6X 
of the market in crude steel production and which if merged would 
become the second largest steel company in the world, announced 
their merger plans. ...both merger plans were positively 
supported by MITI, high officials of other government agencies, 
and certain leading factions in business circles. However, about 
90 economists, all of whom were professors at prominent 
universities, jointly made an announcement that they were opposed 
to the proposed mergers on the grounds that they would 
substantially restrain competition. At their request, the FTC 
began a preliminary investigation of the mergers. In September 
1968, the paper companies voluntarily gave up their plan to merge 
due to the anticipated rejection of the merger by the FTC.
With respect to the two largest steel companies' merger 
plan, the FTC issued a complaint that charged them with a 
violation of Section 15 of the Antimonopoly Act. Four items in 
their product lines were alleged to have high market shares.
...After 13 public trial hearings, the respondents submitted a 
plan for certain self-imposed remedies to the FTC...The FTC then 
issued a consent decision approving the plan as an effective 
remedial measure. ...
17. Rationales for this policy are reminiscent of European Community 
justifications for sectoral and regional aid (Komiya and Yokobori 
[1991, pp. 57-58])=
Divergent views may exist on the exemption of joint actions 
(cartels) for scrapping facilities from the Antimonopoly Law. 
Without this exemption, the market mechanism might have caused 
automatic adjustment and left only the more efficient companies 
in the field and might also have accelerated the transfer of 
resources. Since the declining industries were often 
concentrated in specific regions, however, their sudden downturns 
in production could have resulted in regionally concentrated 
unemployment. Regionally concentrated industries also usually 
have strong political influence. Thus, the industrial policy for 
these declining industries could not be based only on short-term 
economic efficiency. Allowance of these cartels among depressed 
firms may be viewed as the necessary social cost for achieving 





























































































The steel industry merger is in fact the only merger that has 
been found to violate the Japanese antimonopoly law.18 But it may be 
that this masks the full effect of antitrust policy in Japan (Iyori 
and Uesugi [1983, p. 26]):
However, since this merger, there has been no merger plan of 
comparable size, and it can be said that this event was a clear 
sign that the period had ended when a large scale consolidation 
among Japanese firms would be attempted and promoted because of 
fear of foreign competition.
= = = — ----------------------------------------1 '
III. Mergers, Market Power, and Efficiency
A. Theory19
Horizontal Mergers
Recent theoretical work on horizontal mergers takes off from 
Salant, Switzer and Reynolds' [1983] demonstration that in a Cournot 
oligopoly model a horizontal merger will reduce the combined profit of 
the firms involved in the merger unless it includes nearly all firms 
in the industry.20 The intuition behind this result Is straightforward.
A merger has the effect of internalizing marginal losses of revenue 
that an increment in a firm's output inflicts on its merger partners.
The result is a post-merger restriction in output by firms involved in 
the merger. Firms outside the merger, moving along their reaction
18. At least, to 1982; Iyori and Uesugi [1983, p. 82].
19. See the March 1989 issue of the International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, the symposium on horizontal mergers and antitrust in the Fall 
1987 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, and McElroy [1991].
20. See Levin [1990] and Boyer [1991] for related models. Kwoka 




























































































curves, expand output. The net output change -  reduction by firms 
that merge and expansion by firms outside the merger -  can leave the 
post-merger firm with less profit than its components earned before 
the merger.
With linear demand, a homogeneous product, constant marginal cost 
and marginal cost identical across firms, all firms produce equal 
outputs in both pre- and post-merger equilibrium. A merger of m firms 
has the effect of eliminating m-1 firms from the market. The 
consequences for market performance are negative; equilibrium price 
rises and equilibrium output falls, the fewer the number of firms in 
Cournot oligopoly.
This result is unsatisfying, from more than one point of view.
It is not robust to a change in the choice of strategic variable; 
Deneckere and Davidson [1985] show that mergers in price-setting 
oligopoly with product differentiation are profitable, in a model 
otherwise the same as that of Salant, Switzer and Reynolds [1983].
Further, one does not expect firms involved in a merger to 
restrict output to such an extent that it produces only as much as 
firms outside the merger. It is more realistic to expect that a 
combination of firms will produce more than firms outside the 
combination. Perry and Porter [1985] model this type of merger. In 
their model, a firm's cost function depends on the amount of capital 
it owns, and capital is in fixed supply to the industry. A merger 
combines the capital of the constituent firms in the survivor firm.
In equilibrium, the survivor firm is larger than firms not involved in 
the merger.
Nor does one expect to observe firms voluntarily engaging in 



























































































an industry are observed, it is reasonable to conclude that the firms 
involved expect them to be profitable. We may then investigate the 
sources of expected profitability.
A merger might be profitable because the survivor firm, without 
being more efficient than parent firms, has greater market power. In 
this case, a merger will reduce consumer welfare and social welfare.
Or a merger might be profitable because the survivor firm is more 
efficient than parent firms. Even if such a merger increases market 
power, cost savings create the possibility that the overall effect of 
the merger on market performance will be positive.
Farrell and Shapiro [1990] show that mergers will harm consumers 
unless cost savings are very great.21 Write the profit of a single 
firm in a n-firm Cournot oligopoly as
(1) x, - p(q( -  Q .,)qi -  c ,(qi)
(where Q_, is output of all firms except firm i). Cost functions 
are allowed to differ across firms. The first-order condition for 
maximization of Jtj is
(2) p(Q] * q(p'(Q) -  cj(q (] - 0 , 
where 0 is total output and prime denotes a derivative.
Farrell and Shapiro show that under reasonable conditions if a 
single firm changes its output, and all other firms adjust output 
along their reaction curves, total output changes in the same 
direction as the output of the firm initiating the change. It follows 
that to analyze the impact of a merger on total output, and therefore
21. See Werden [1991] and Farrell and Shapiro [1991], as well as 




























































































on price, it is necessary only to determine the impact of the merger
on the output of the firms involved in the merger.
Now let the first m firms merge. Let premerger outputs be t}(,
i = l ,  .... n, with 0 total premerger output and 0M premerger output 
of the firms that merge. At the premerger outputs, marginal revenue 
of the survivor firm is
(3) MRm (Qm) '  P(5) * 0 mP'(5) •
The firm formed by merger will reduce output if and only if its 
marginal cost exceeds its marginal revenue, or if and only if
(4) C„(Um) s P ^ 5 * 5 Mp'(iJ) •
This is the same as
(5) -  0 Mp-(0) > p(0) -  c^(Qm) .
But the premerger first-order condition for firm i implies
(6) p (0) -  ciCTfjj = -  q iPm
for i = 1, 2, .... m, which in turn gives
m m
(7) -  0Mp’(0] -  -  (.S q ^ p IO ) - -  c ;(q ()] .
Substituting (7) in (5), the firm formed by merger will reduce output, 
implying a price increase and a reduction in consumer welfare, if and 
only if
m
(8) [pCCFJ - c;c?()j > p(<5) - c;(£)„) .
But the cost reductions that followed from a merger would have to 
be very large indeed for this condition to be violated. Consider a 
merger of two firms. Condition (8) implies that the post-merger price 




























































































(9) p (Q ) -  c ^ ( 0 M) > p(Q) -  cjCqp -  p(Q) -  c ^ q ^  , 
or if
(10) c ; ^ }  - cm (Qm) 2 P(Q) “  ^ (q , )  ■
Without loss of generality, let cj(q(J < cjfi^ ). (10] implies that for a
merger to reduce price and benefit consumers, the marginal cost of the 
most efficient pre-merger firm would have to exceed the marginal cost 
of the post-merger firm by at least the profit margin of the least -
efficient pre-merger firm, with costs and margins evaluated at pre­
merger outputs.
This suggests that mergers will almost always harm consumers. 
The net welfare effect of a merger will usually, therefore, depend on 
a tradeoff between harm to consumers and increased economic profit 
accruing to the owners of firms involved in the merger.22 This leaves 
open the policy question whether or not income gains of firm owners 
will be given less weight than the income losses of consumers.
Whether this should be the case or not, in the end, is not subject to 
economic analysis.23
Dutz [1989] models the rationalization of production by firms in 
declining industries that merge and retire their least efficient
22. The seminal treatment of this sort of tradeoff is Williamson 
[1968],
23. Scholars working in the tradition of the Chicago school have 
argued that the purpose of U.S. antitrust law is to minimize 
deadweight welfare loss, implying equal weight for producers' gains
and consumers' losses. See Bork [1978], and for a contrary view Lande 
[1982]. George and Jacquemin [1990] argue that for European Community 
competition policy "...the goal seems to be to maximise consumers' 
surplus rather than the sum of consumers and producers' surplus." See 





























































































capacity. Where pre- and post-merger markets are characterized by 
excess capacity, mergers are socially beneficial. Examples from the 
U.S. steel, railroad, brewing, and auto parts industries seem 
consistent with his analysis.
Vertical mergers
Market Foreclosure
Consider a merger between a manufacturer of shoes and a chain of 
stores that distributes shoes. Much public policy concern with such a 
merger has focused on the possibility that such a vertical merger 
would lock the manufacturer and distributor in a tight bilateral 
relationship, effectively withdrawing each from the horizontal market 
in which it had previously operated as an independent agent. In a 
postmerger market, the story goes, independent manufacturers could not 
expect to sell their shoes through the mergered, foreclosed, retail 
chain. Nor could independent retailers reasonably expect to be able 
to sell the shoes of the mergered, foreclosed manufacturer. On this 
analysis, one vice of a vertical mergers stems from its effect in 
foreclosing parts of two markets, thus reducing the pre-existing state 
of competition.2-4
Salinger (1988) considers the case of a vertically integrated 
firm operating with Cournot conjectures in imperfectly competitive 
intermediate- and final-good markets.24 5 He supposes that each unit 
of final good output requires one unit of the intermediate good as an 
input. This assumption is not restrictive.
24. Brown Shoe, op. cit.: Eighth Report on Competition Policy CE. C. 
Commission [1979, p. 104]: Fair Trade Commission [1980].




























































































Cournot expectations imply that the vertically integrated firm 
expects final good output to increase by one unit if it sells an extra 
unit of the intermediate good (other intermediate good producers being 
expected to hold their outputs constant). Similarly, if a vertically 
integrated firm buys an extra unit of the intermediate good on the 
open market, it expects other final good producers to hold their 
output constant.
Assume it is profitable to sell the intermediate good and it is 
profitable for nonintegrated firms to sell the final good: p  ̂ > c, and
Pr -  Pj -  cF > 0. The two inequalities together imply pf  -  cF -  c,
> -  Cj > 0. But these relations together mean that a vertically
integrated firm will neither buy nor sell the intermediate good on the 
open market. Since p( > c,, if a vertically integrated firm wishes to 
increase final good output, it is more profitable to do so by 
producing an extra unit of the intermediate good, with at a cost of 
c,, than by buying a unit of the intermediate good on the open market 
at price p .
Now suppose a vertically integrated firm sells a certain amount 
of the intermediate good on the open market. It could pul! this 
output off the intermediate good market and use it to produce more of 
the final product. Final good output and therefore final good price 
would be unchanged. But since PF ‘  cf '  c i s P, " c i- the integrated 
firm would earn a greater profit per unit selling the output at the 




























































































the intermediate good level. Hence it is not profit maximizing for 
the integrated firm to sell the intermediate good on the open market.
In markets of this kind, therefore, one would expect vertically 
integrated firms to foreclose as an equilibrium strategy. To this 
extent, vertical integration reduces competition. On the other hand, 
the impact of vertical integration on price, and therefore on consumer 
welfare is ambiguous.26 However, in Salinger's model, an increase in 
the number of vertically integrated firms raises the equilibrium 
profit of vertically integrated firms if and only if final good price 
goes up.
Other market power explanations of vertical integration
A vertically integrated firm that controls or influences the 
upstream price of a necessary input can place nonintegrated rivals in 
the downstream market at a competitive disadvantage by increasing the 
price of the intermediate good. Adams and Dirlam [1964] present a 
classic analysis of this type of price squeeze in the U. S. steel 
industry.
Somewhat more generally, Chandler [1977, p. 364] emphasizes the 
entry-barrier creating effect of vertical integration, particularly 
forward integration into distribution:27
26. This is the general result; see Westfield [1981] for the case of 
a monopoly input supplier.




























































































Except in the production of primary metals, a manufacturing 
enterprise rarely became and remained large until it had built 
its own extensive marketing organization. Its owners took this 
step when the maintenance of high-volume output required precise 
and detailed scheduling of the flows of finished products to mass 
markets or the maintenance of specialized distributing facilities 
and marketing services. The creation of distributing and 
marketing networks to provide such coordination, facilities, and 
services caused the mass producers to internalize several 
processes of production and distribution and the market 
transactions between them within a single enterprise. Such 
internalization permitted the visible hand of administrative 
coordination to make more intensive use of the resources invested 
in these processes of production and distribution than could the 
invisible hand of market coordination.
Such administrative coordination in turn created formidable 
barriers to entry. High-volume throughput and stock-turn reduced unit 
costs. Advertising and the provision of services maintained customer 
loyalty. Rival firms were rarely able to compete until they had built 
comparable marketing organizations of their own.
These analyses of vertical integration point to its strategic, 
market-power enhancing consequences.
Price discrimination
If a firm has market power, it is profitable to discriminate in 
price between classes of customers with different price elasticities 
of demand. A necessary condition for such price discrimination is 
that higher-elasticity consumers, who are offered a lower price, be 
unable to purchase for resale to lower-elasticity consumers. If an 
input-producing firm sells to firms with different elasticities, it 
can effectively price discriminate by integrating forward to high- 
elasticity segments of the final market and supplying low -elasticity 
segments at a profit-maximizing, higher, price. Such price 
discrimination is an exercise of market power. But it is not 





























































































Efficiency explanations of vertical integration 
Distortions in input choice28
If the technology for production of the final good permits 
substitution among inputs, then an intermediate good producer that 
raises price will induce substitution away from his own product. By 
integrating forward into final good production, such a producer can 
guarantee input choice based on relative marginal costs at the final 
good level, increasing efficiency and his own profit. 
Information/Uncertainty
Arrow [1975] shows that if input supply is random and upstream 
producers have more information about realized supply, downstream 
producers will have an incentive to integrate backward to improve the 
quality of their information about the input market. Carlton [1979] 
presents a model in which it is final demand that is uncertain.
Uncertain final demand translates into uncertain input demand. There 
is thus the possibility that aggregate input production and aggregate 
derived demand will be "out of synch": either too much of the input 
will be produced in which case it would have to be discarded or stored 
in inventory, or else not enough of the input would be produced, 
implying an input shortage and a constraint on production of the final 
product. This potential lack of synchronization between input supply 
and input demand creates an incentive for firms to integrate 
vertically.





























































































The transaction cost theory of the firm is among other things a 
theory of vertical integration. Two aspects of human nature -  bounded 
rationality plus opportunism -  and one of transactions -  the extent to 
which it is necessary to invest in highly specific sunk assets -  are 
highlighted as factors determining when it is economic to bring 
transactions within the firm.
Bounded rationality -  a limited ability to anticipate unfolding 
reality -  implies that it is impossible to write all-encompassing 
contracts to regulate transactions. Opportunism - "self-interest plus 
guile” (Williamson [1975, p. 26; 1981, p. 1545]) -  implies that 
economic agents expect individuals or firms with whom they have 
negotiated a contract to break it if the expected benefit from 
breaking the contract, net of expected penalties, exceeds the expected 
benefit from adhering to the contract.
When repeated transactions involve the investment of sunk assets 
by the purchaser, what was initially the selection of one of many 
potential suppliers is transformed into a bilateral monopoly 
situation. Given the expectation of opportunistic behavior by the 
supplier, the purchaser should expect the supplier to seek to 
renegotiate the terms of the agreement, over time, to the benefit of 
the supplier. To avoid the potential loss of investment in sunk 
assets, there is an incentive to take the supplier into the firm.29 30
29. See Williamson [1971, 1985, Chapters 4 and 5, 1986] and Casson 
[1984],
30. Bonanno and Vickers [1988] and Lin [1988] develop models in which 





























































































Scott [1989, p. 37] argues that conglomerate mergers can create
or reinforce market power because they facilitate tacit collusion:'31
Consider two markets, each with only two sellers. In the 
first and the second we find seller A. In the first, we find 
seller B competing with seller A. In the second, seller A 
competes with seller C. If sellers B and C merge, even though 
they are not competitors, the merger creates a situation in 
which ...tacit cooperation...is more easily attained. Since 
the same set of sellers meets in two markets, there are twice 
as many opportunities to come to understand one another. The 
process of reaching a consensus on price is facilitated because 
there is more contact.
Bemheim and Whinston [1990] present a game-theoretic model of 
the same phenomenon. They examine the effect of multimarket contact 
on the stability of noncooperative collusion. Beginning with a model 
of price-setting firms and homogeneous products, they show that 
multimarket contact has no impact on market performance if firms and 
markets are identical and if returns to scale are constant. When the 
number of firms varies from market to market, or there are cost 
differences across firms, or products are differentiated, multimarket 
contact can facilitate noncooperative collusion.
Teece [1980] applies the transaction cost theory of the firm to
conglomerate diversification. He argues [1980, p. 224] that32
diversification can represent a mechanism for capturing 
integration economies associated with the simultaneous supply 
of inputs common to a number of production processes geared 
to distinct final product firms.
In particular, Teece highlights common use of knowhow and 
specialized indivisible physical assets as favoring diversification.
31. See also Kantarelis and Veendorp [1988].




























































































Knowhow is knowledge which involves ieaming-by-doing as an essential 
feature. Transactions that involve knowhow are therefore open to 
opportunistic exploitation, which encourages bringing them within the 
firm. As regards highly specialized physical assets, markets for 
their services are likely to be thin, precisely in proportion to the 
extent that they are specialized. To cope with the possibility of 
market failure, it is often cost effective for a firm to diversify 
across industries in which the asset can be utilized.33
Table 1: MES Plant Size versus Market Concentration
Industry MES/S 4 x MES/S CR4







Lacquers 1.4 5.6 22
Petroleum Refining 1.9 7.6 33
Shoes (other than rubber! 0.2 0.8 26




Steel Works 2.6 10.4 48
Ball & Roller Bearings 
Household Refrigerators
1.4 5.6 54
and Freezers 14.1 56.4 73
Storage Batteries 1.9 7.6 61
Note: engineering estimates of minimum efficient scale: figures are 
for 1967, and assume markets are national.
Source: Scherer [1974],






























































































Economies of scale are notoriously difficult to estimate. Most
studies, however, show that economies of scale run out at levels of
market concentration much lower than those that are typical of
industrialized economies. The results of Scherer [1974], reproduced
in Table 1, are typical.34 35 His own summary is [1974, pp. 51-52]:
Clearly, important scale economies exist. Equally clearly, they 
are exhausted at relatively modest concentration levels in many 
manufacturing industries of a nation as large as the United 
States.
Horizontal mergers
Baker and Bresnahan [1985] estimate demand curves for Anheuser- 
Busch, the leading U.S. beer brewer, and two smaller firms in the same 
industry, Pabst and Coors. Their results imply that a merger between 
either of the smaller firms and Anheuser-Busch would increase market 
power for Anheuser-Busch, without increasing market power for the 
other party to the merger. Similarly, a merger between the two 
smaller firms is not predicted to yield an increase in market power. 
These results suggest that competition from these smaller firms limits 
the ability of Anheuser-Busch to exercise market power.33
34. See Pratten [1988] for a comprehensive survey.
35. Tremblay and Tremblay [1988] examine the determinants of mergers 
in the U.S. brewing industry, and conclude that the search for market 
power does not appear to be an important factor. However, they use 
the Herfindahl index to measure the market power motive, on the 
argument that "the market power motive for merger would be directly 
related to industry concentration since a horizontal merger can only 
increase market power when concentration is high." But this argument 
is correct only in the absence of product differentiation, a condition 
which manifestly is not met for the U.S. brewing industry. An added 
factor is that their measure of the Herfindahl index is calculated on



























































































Additional evidence that horizontal mergers can reinforce market 
power comes from Barton and Sherman [19841, who examine the effect of 
two successive mergers on the relative price of differentiated brands 
of microfilm. A 1976 merger increased the market share of the 
industry’s dominant firm in the diazo microfilm market from 40 to 55 
per cent, and the price diazo microfilm products rose nearly 10 per 
cent, relative to the price of vesicular microfilm products. In 1979, 
a second merger increased the dominant firm's share of the vesicular 
microfilm market from 67 to 93 per cent, and the price of vesicular 
microfilm products rose more than 1 /3  relative to the price of diazo 
microfilm products.
Vertical Integration36
Hennart [1988, pp. 282-283] uses transaction cost theory to 
compare the extent of upstream vertical integration in the aluminum 
and tin industries. Transaction cost theory predicts greater vertical 
integration the smaller the number of actual or potential trading 
partners, the greater the investment in sunk assets necessary to 
support a type of transaction, and the greater the uncertainty 
associated with the transaction. Vertical integration should be less, 
all else equal, the greater the differences between upstream and 
downstream markets and the greater the cost of monitoring employees 
within the firm.
The aluminum industry is virtually a paradigmatic example of the 
transaction cost theory of vertical integration. Operation of a 
minimum efficient scale bauxite mine requires a substantial and 
largely sunk investment. Because bauxite is bulky and costly  to ship,



























































































it is not economically feasible to ship bauxite to  distant refineries.
At the same time, bauxite is a heterogeneous ore, and alumina 
refineries tend to be designed for a specific type of ore. A bauxite 
supplier and an independent alumina refiner would very quickly find 
themselves locked into a bilateral monopoly relationship, with large 
sunk investments at stake. Not surprisingly, Hennart reports that in 
1976 91 per cent of bauxite, by volume, was refined within vertically 
integrated firms.
There are two main types of tin-bearing deposits. Erosion of 
tin-bearing rock builds up low-grade alluvial deposits that lie near 
the surface and can be refined with a standardized technology.
Mineral deposits tend to be underground, requiring a greater 
investment for efficient operation, and producing an ore that requires 
specific tailoring of refining operations. As the transaction cost 
theory would predict, extraction and refining of alluvial deposits 
tend to be carried out by independent firms, while processing of 
mineral deposits is for the most part vertically integrated.
Masten, Meehan, and Snyder [1989] emphasize the importance of 
investment in specific human capital as in incentive for vertical 
integration. Using information on 118 motor vehicle components used 
by Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors, they estimate the equation 
(11) VII -  10.47 » 4.45HC » 0.92ASSET -  2.29SITE , R -  0.36.
The dependent variable, VII, is the percentage of the company's 
component needs that are produced within the firm. The dependent 
variables are measured on a scale from 1 (low) to 10 (high). HC 
measures the extent to which a transaction requires transaction 





























































































transaction specific physical assets, and SITE measures the importance 
of locating successive stages of production close to one another. The 
estimated coefficient of HC is statistically significant at the 1 per 
cent level. No other estimated coefficient that is statistically 
significant at even the 5 per cent level. This test, therefore, 
suggests that it is the need to invest in highly specific human 
capital that promotes vertical integration. This in turn suggests 
that a critical advantage of vertical integration is the efficient 
limitation of opportunistic behavior by bringing critical employees 
within the firm.
Caves and Bradburd [1988] construct an index of forward vertical 
integration for a sample of 83 U. S. 4-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification producer good industries. The index is a weighted 
average of the fraction of companies in the supplying industry that 
are integrated forward into customer industries in 1975. The weight 
applied to the fraction of companies integrated into a particular 
industry is the fraction of supplying industry shipments going to  that 
industry. Their results indicate that vertical integration rises with 
supplying industry and buying industry market concentration and with 
an index of share of the supplying industry's product in costs of 
customer industries. This is consistent with the argument that small- 
numbers bargaining problems induce vertical integration.
They also find that vertical integration rises with indexes of 
buying- and supplying-industry spending on research and development - 
a measure of investment in highly specific human capital -  and with an 




























































































index of investment in specific physical capital. All these 
coefficient estimates are statistically significant, in varying 
degrees, and support the transaction cost theory of vertical integration.
Conglomerate mergers
Scott [1989] presents two case studies of conglomerate mergers 
that had the effect of increasing multimarket contact among 
competitors. He also reports a cross-sectional statistical analysis 
of 95 large U.S. conglomerate mergers for 1977, and finds that they 
served to increase multimarket contact with competitors for firms 
involved in the mergers.
As regards the impact of multimarket contact on market 
performance, Scott [1991] presents an alternative explanation of the 
empirical findings of Bain [1956]. Bain attributed a positive impact 
of market concentration and entry conditions on the profits of large 
firms within industries as confirmation of a relationship between 
market concentration and tacit collusion. Scott shows that the firms 
in Bain's sample enjoyed a significant amount of contact across 
markets, suggesting that Bain’s results are consistent with the 
hypothesis "that multimarket contact is necessary for a profitable 
consensus among diversified oligopolists.”
Teece [1980] discusses the relatively recent diversification of 
petroleum firms into markets for alternative fuels, and suggests that 
this diversification is consistent with the desire to spread the use 
of technological knowhow across several industries. To the extent 




























































































alternative fuels -  and it appears from Teece's Table 1 that this is 
the case -  then the diversification of petroleum firms is also 
consistent with Scott’s [1989] argument that the desire to promote
multimarket contact is an engine for diversification.37 38
38C. The Market for Corporate Control
Adam Smith took note of the implications of the separation of 
firm ownership from firm control for market performance (Smith [1937, 
pp. 699-700]):
The trade of a joint stock company is always managed by a 
court of directors. This court ...is frequently subject... 
to the controul of a general court of proprietors. But the 
greater part of those proprietors seldom pretend to understand 
any thing of the business of the company: and ...give themselves 
no trouble about it, but receive contentedly such ...dividend, 
as the directors think proper to make to them. ...The directors 
of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people's money than of their own, cannot well be expected, that 
they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over 
their own. ...Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always 
prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such 
a company.
Modem treatments of the topic begin with Berle and Means [1932). 
And it is to Marris [1963] that we owe the observation that managers 
who do not tend to the interests of the firm's owners open themselves 
up to the threat of being replaced. This leads to a view of the 
merger, in particular the takeover, as an efficiency-enhancing and - 
enforcing device in the market for corporate control.
Such mergers could be horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate: if
a firm's management maximizes sales, growth, managerial prerogatives,
37. Stewart, Harris and Carleton [1984] report significant positive 
correlations between advertising Intensity and R & D intensity of 
acquired and acquiring firms, results that seem consistent with the 
Teece hypothesis.





























































































or anything other than the expected present-discounted value of the 
income stream of the firm, it becomes profitable for a more efficient 
management team to mount a takeover bid that will offer shareholders a 
lump sum equal to the difference between the actual and the potential 
value of the firm. To avoid the possibility of such a takeover, 
management is induced to maximize the value of the firm.
There are transaction costs in the market for corporate control, 
rooted in imperfect and impacted information (Williamson (1974, pp. 
1481-1482]). Managers may diverge from strategies that maximize 
present discounted value because they have an information advantage 
over shareholders. But this means that they have an information 
advantage over management teams that might mount a takeover attempt. 
Further, there are expenses associated with a takeover attempt - 
shareholders must be contacted and convinced that the new management 
team offers them a better value than incumbent management. Finally, 
incumbent managers may use various strategies -  golden parachute 
retirement schemes for displaced management to raise the cost of a 
takeover attempt.
Event Studies
Considerations of this kind imply that the managements of 
publicly owned companies will have some leeway to deviate from 
present-value maximizing strategies. This is confirmed by Smiley's 
[1976] study of the impact of takeover offers on the share price of 
target firms. His results suggest that the market value of a firm can 
fall to 87 per cent of the maximum value before triggering a takeover 
attempt.
Financial economists have tested the efficiency explanation of 



























































































takeover attempt on the stock prices or firms involved in the merger.
The results are quite consistent (Caves [1989, p. 153]).-39 40
Acquisitions always entail a large gain for the target firm's 
shareholders over the market value of the free-standing entity. 
The proportional gain ...amounts to 30 percent for the change 
in corporate control via tender offer or takeover, 20 percent 
via merger... The average return to the bidding firm's 
shareholders is less clear. Some studies have found small but 
statistically significant gains, others small losses. It seems 
safe to conclude that the bidder's shareholders approximately 
break even.
If takeovers produce a clear gain for stockholders of the target 
firm, and leave the owners of the firm mounting the takeover about as 
well off as before, they seem to produce a net gain for society. But 
this is a conclusion that should be treated as tentative at best.
One of the premises of event studies is that the stock market 
value of the firm is the best possible estimate of the present 
discounted value of the firm, given available information.'10 If this 
assumption fails, then some takeover attempts may have nothing to do 
with replacing an inefficient management. If a firm with a perfectly 
effective management is undervalued by the stock market, that firm may 
be the target of a takeover attempt simply because it is a good buy.
The claim that the stock market value of the firm is an efficient 
distillation of all available information, and that mergers and 
takeovers are a rational response to this information, is difficult to 
reconcile with the record of 1980s U.S. takeover attempts, which
39. See also Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter [1988) and Scherer [1988).




























































































resembled more a speculative game of musical chairs41 than a 
rationality-driven search for efficiency.42
It also seems hard to reconcile the idea that mergers and 
takeovers have efficiency motives and effects with the number of 
takeovers that are undone through divestiture.43 Ravenscraft and 
Scherer [1987] review a number of case studies of mergers which did 
not work and ended in divestiture. Sometimes the mergers failed 
because of problems with the acquiring firm that were discovered only 
after merger -  which confirms the importance of imperfect information 
about firms' performances in the merger process. Sometimes the 
mergers failed because the acquiring firm was unable to establish 
effective or improved control over the acquired firm. In these cases 
the blending of internal organizations did not work - takeover of one 
firm by another does not automatically mean that a less efficient 
management team is being replaced by a more efficient management team.
Studies of post-merger performance
Mueller [1985] studies the impact of mergers on market share for 
samples of companies drawn from the 1,000 largest U.S. firms of 1950
41. Deck chairs on the Titanic?
42. Nabisco and Standard Brands merged in 1981 to form Nabisco 
Brands, a processed food conglomerate: in 1985, Nabisco Brands was 
acquired by R. J. Reynolds to form RJR-Nabisco; in 1988, Kohlberg 
Kravis Roberts purchased RJR-Nabisco for 25.1 billion dollars. For a 
case study, see Burrough and Helyar [1990], More generally, see Adams 
and Brock [1989],
43. Beatrice Foods was purchased by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts in 1985 
for 6.2 billion dollars, a purchase financed largely by the sale of
junk bonds. By 1988, 9 subsidiaries had been spun off from Beatrice 
and sold for nearly 7 billion dollars. One motive for the sell-offs 
was to meet the interest burden on the bonds sold to finance the 




























































































Table 2- Mergers and market share
Conglomerate: MS72 = 0.011 * 0.885MS50 -  0.705MS5o[ acquired
Horizontal: MS72 -  0.027 ♦ 0.547MS50 -  0.403MS50)( lQ l!f *o‘]UlreCi J
Notes: MS72 is 1972 market share, MS50 is 1950 market share. All
coefficients are statistically significant.
Source: Mueller [1985, Table 2, Table 3].
and 1972. Using a simple autoregressive specification, he estimates
equations of the form shown in Table 2. The results show regression
toward the mean -  high market shares tend to decline -  whether or not
a firm involved in a merger. The market share of acquired firms tend
to decline much more rapidly than the market share of firms that
remain independent. This result occurs whether the merger was
horizontal or conglomerate. This hardly suggests that merger improves
the efficiency of the acquired firm.
Ravenscraft and Scherer use a sample of observations on 2,732
U.S. lines of business"44 to test two hypotheses about the effect of
mergers on profitability [1989, p. 101]:
First, if mergers displace managers who have performed poorly 
at the task of profit maximization, acquired companies should 
have lower average pre-merger profitability than their home 
industry peers. Second, if mergers lead to economies of scale 
or scope, post-merger profits should rise relative to pre-merger 
profits and/or peer industry averages, other relevant variables 
held equal.
Acquired companies tended to have a greater-than-industry average 
profitability, before acquisition (Table 3). This is true overall, 
and for all types of mergers except vertical.
44. That is, operations of diversified firms, classified by industry 





























































































Table 3: Acquired company pre-merger excess profitability, by
merger type












Note: profitability is measured by operating income as a percentage
of end-of-period assets; excess profitability is line-of-business 
profitability minus average profitability of the two-digit industry in 
which the line-of-business is classified.
Source; Ravenscraft and Scherer [1989, Table 2].
In a series of cross-section regressions, Ravenscraft and Scherer 
examine the impact of differences in acquired firm characteristics on 
line-of-business profitability. When they regress line-of-business 
profitability on the share of line-of-business assets acquired by 
merger, the estimated coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant. In other regressions, market share has a statistically 
significant positive impact on profitability, but different variables 
measuring the share of assets acquired by merger continue to have 
negative or statistically insignificant coefficients. Only if assets 
were acquired in a merger between firms of roughly equal size was 
there any indication that the effect on profitability of the p ost- 
merger line-of-business was positive.
Ravenscraft and Scherer also compare the change in profitability 
over time of two samples of similar firms, one of firms acquired by 
merger and the other of firms that remained independent. In both 
groups, profitability of high-profit firms tended to fall over time - 



























































































acquired in mergers fell much more rapidly over time than the
profitability of firms that remained independent.
These results do not support the efficiency interpretation of
mergers. On average, acquired firms were not less profitable than
their industry average before takeover; merger did not raise post-
merger profitability; and the profitability of acquired lines-of -
business tended to decline at an accelerated rate. Ravenscraft and
Scherer conclude 11989, pp. 115-1161):
The ...explanation for acquired units' sharp profit decline 
must be control loss owing to more complex organizational 
structures and lessened managerial competence and/or motivation. 
This control loss explanation is consistent with the high 
incidence of divestiture following acquisition and the tendency 
for sold-off units to have negative operating income in the 
year before their divestiture.
Iwasaki (1988, pp. 507-508] summarizes empirical studies of the 
impact of mergers on profitability in Japan;
There are a number of existing studies that have tried to 
analyze the movements in the rates of profit just before and 
after merger and reorganization. Of the 14 major mergers during 
the 1957-1966 period leading to formation of firms with total 
capital amounting to over ¥ 1 billion, the cases in which the 
rate of net profits on sales improved and those where it 
deteriorated were exactly half at seven each, and it is not 
possible to draw any clear-cut conclusion as to the effect of 
mergers on efficiency.
As for 44 major cases of mergers between 1964-1975, a 
comparison for three years before and after the merger shows no 
case of improved rates of profit, but a comparison extended for a 
give year period before and after the merger reveals such cases. 
...for the 18 large-scale mergers, about two-thirds show an 
improvement in the rate of profit. In view of policy 
authorities' enthusiasm on the reorganization policy, it Is 
interesting to note that the mergers of firms with poor 
performance or of those in depressed industries ended up with 




























































































Public policy toward mergers and joint ventures is increasingly 
based on the belief that the consequences of such activities for 
market performance are largely positive. There is little supporting 
evidence for this belief.
£ Theoretical models predict that mergers will often be privately 
unprofitable, because of the reactions of firms outside the merger.
If mergers are privately profitable - so that they can be expected to 
occur -  it is nonetheless unlikely that those benefits will be passed 
on to consumers in the form of lower prices.
Empirical evidence suggests that firms involved in mergers suffer 
reductions in market share and profitability, compared with similar 
firms that are not involved in mergers. Takeovers yield a one-time 
benefit to shareholders of acquired firms, but do not benefit 
shareholders of acquiring firms. Taken as a whole, these results 
suggest that mergers typically do not yield efficiency gains, that 
mergers cannot be interpreted as the market's way of enforcing profit- 
maximizing behavior and that mergers do not, on average, improve 
consumer well. As regards economic efficiency and concentration, 
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